

# The Concept of Overpopulation as a Challenge for an Idealistic Moral Attitude

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## Abstract

This article claims that an idealistic concept of morality is tautological and impracticable in the perspective of overpopulation. As a precondition for moral analysis, this hypothetical case, that the world is inflicted by overpopulation, shows an obvious distinction of moral attitudes: Either (a) it is required to abandon a moral attitude, or (b) to accept the concept of morality as in a tautological state.

## I – Preliminary considerations

The main treatise of this article will be a questioning of the *general moral problem* received from the moral idealist's conception of a *moral truth*. This includes any moral theory which offers imperatives, obligations, social contracts, virtues and vices as an example of *how to act*. It is mainly the absurdity of ascribing life a moral dimension in a world in conflict, where morals are either a contradiction or tautology that seems to be problematic, as I will clarify later. Nevertheless, to treat moral as problems concerned the *right behavior*, is not the proper way to deal with moral problems in general. I will therefore argue throughout the article that there is no such thing as an ideal nor idea of morality, by which we understand morality. This is contrary to Immanuel Kant, since he claims that we do not attain a duty to any *official* virtue (ge. Tugendpflichten) nor right (ge. Rechtspflichten) (Kant 1995: 287). Morality in this article is rather

understood as a *private relationship* and I will by this conception challenge the general conception of an idealistic moral attitude.

The assertion of morality as contradiction or tautology<sup>1</sup> in this article is based on a distinction of the temporally conditioned content of moral attitudes. Notice that I will make two different temporal distinctions later hereof: 1) *The temporal view* is basically a threefold distinction of time, which refers to the understanding of time; *past, present and future*. 2) But when I later on will analyze on behalf of this distinction, I implore you to notice that the category of the past brings two different scenarios for the analysis. I thus define following distinction as the *temporal distinction*: a) How to prevent, b) how to settle, c) how to overcome, and d) how to relate.

However, since we are about to discuss the moral implication, it should be made clear to the reader that I have no intention to discuss the *necessary circumstances* for claiming overpopulation, falling birth rates or any other politically substantial debate. Nevertheless, my interest in overpopulation is not of any further political interest than the acknowledgment of the political severity the subject deserves. My interest lies in the discussion of a metaphysical problem that is underlying in the idealistic comprehension of morality, which happens to be perfectly exposed given the premises for a life in a world in the state of overpopulation. Furthermore, overpopulation as a global problem becomes bilateral due to my following premises in a hypothetical scenario. (a) First, overpopulation is a global problem because it *will happen* worldwide. (b) Secondly, overpopulation is a global problem because it *does concern* human preservation worldwide. One cannot just ignore it

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<sup>1</sup> Categories such as *contradiction* and *tautology* are results of what Bertrand Russel calls 'Laws of Thought' (Russel 2007: 51). In short, a contradiction is when something also is something it is not. To say 'it is raining and not raining' is a contradiction, which always is false due to the Laws ( $p \wedge \neg p$ ). A tautology is when something is proposed as either-or, and therefore always will be true. The sentence 'it is raining or it is not raining' is always true, due to the Laws (law of identity) ( $p \vee \neg p$ ).

without facing death. Thus, 'Overpopulation' is treated as a conflict that affects the daily life of everyone in the world, and not as, for example, a local famine due to harsh weather, locust plagues or social injustice.

Anyhow, let us pretend that the world powers are lacking food supplies and the unbalance in the nations needs will assert central moral problems in the demand for preservation. Again, the basic account for asserting the *world in a state of overpopulation* is where there is too little bread and too many mouths to feed (Brown 2009: 31-54; Malthus 1998: 8). More clearly: Someone has to die so others can live.

## **II – Clarification of overpopulation as a moral problem**

We have now defined the article's main interest in a discussion of idealistic moral content. We, thereby, consider a moral approach in a world in conflict due to overpopulation and a lack of food resources. The moral problems followed by overpopulation are, overall, considered from an existential point of view, since governmental interventions are not relevant: first, there is no food to distribute, and secondly, the challenge of an idealistic concept of moral is asserted from an existential aspect and not a political one. I will further on elaborate this reasoning in this chapter. However, if we maintain an existential perspective, we may notice that existential ethics are not a savior for a conduct in an overpopulated world. That is to say, that we consider existential ethics troubled as Mary Warnock stresses:

Thus it is sometimes possible to deduce an ethical theory, or something like it, from their philosophy [Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre], for it may be possible to say, in their persons, 'This is how you ought to see human conduct'. But, in general, this is all that can be done [...] [and] it must be clearly stated at the outset that what emerges is for the most part something less than a complete ethical theory or system (Warnock 1969: 2, my additions)

Therefore, our existential point of view is rather based on individuality and free will than on an idea concerning a functional whole as a complete ethical theory; like Rousseau's social contract for an example. Immanuel Kant expresses the same point by linking both just and virtue together as a duty for which one must learn to gain *faculty of freedom*; " [...] welches ganz übersinnlich ist [...] " (Kant 1995: 288). The challenge of an idealistic moral attitude is rather considered as a critique of a metaphysical problem and the conception of freedom. I will outline the former later and thus for now notice the latter: We rather think of freedom as Kierkegaard does in *Philosophical Fragments*: "Tilblivelsens Forandring er Virkeligheden, Overgangen skeer ved Friheden"<sup>2</sup> (Kierkegaard 1963c: 69). Which means that the change of the becoming is reality itself, by which the transition from the state of becoming to the change happens by the act of freedom.

Nevertheless, the problem with a 'functioning whole' like Rousseau's *The Social Contract* is that it is metaphorically quite familiar with a *Rat King*, a natural phenomenon in which rats are entangled together by their tails in dirt, frost and feces, and thereby are born together for slowly to die and rot together. The social contract does not help the individual in an overpopulated world because there is no longer a functioning mutual contract between the individual and the public, as Rousseau expresses the need for (Rousseau 2007: 27). It is rather the existential idea that freedom transcends reality and its rules by willing the possibility in the becoming (Kierkegaard 1963a: 112). We can therefore say that the existential attitude can transcend any rule in a private relationship, and, thus neglect the official doctrine, which is not considered as constituted by any supersensory idea of a faculty of freedom as Kant expresses above. When we want to outline the moral problems themselves, we require more clarification. I divide this section into three charters: The first defines the

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<sup>2</sup> "The change of coming into existence is actuality; the transition takes place in freedom" (Kierkegaard (1985): *Philosophical Fragments*, translated by Hong & Hong, Princeton University, p. 75)

involvement, the second treats the metaphysical problem in our moral problem, and the third sets the view in a temporal perspective.

#### 1) Defining involvement

The international constellation and distribution of the power of nations are unknown to us when the circumstances for overpopulation are explicated as a general comprehension of life. We should, therefore, consider how we could, at a minimum, describe and anticipate the nations' power mechanism from their global and international constellation. I, therefore, find Jean-François Lyotard's summarization of Wittgenstein's *language games* suitable for the task. Lyotard make three noticeable observations hereof (Lyotard 1984: 10):

- 1) Rules are contracted, as in, they are not legislated by themselves but by people, explicit or not.
- 2) If there are no rules, there is no game.
- 3) Every utterance, as an action, is a 'move' in the game.

Consequently translated into our cause, at least we must assume that there will be people. These people possess a *will*, which is in extension and as a *consequence* of itself: The will expresses itself in *doing as an act*, just like Kierkegaard's anticipation of freedom. Even if people are passive and are not changing or engaging with anything, they are still acting in the comprehension of *not doing anything* concerning the relevant case. We are inclined to call this the *principle of an act's singularity*. Therefore, however the power is distributed, it does not concern the moral problem from overpopulation because it is not a question of whether people will act and do something due to the principle of an act's singularity. Expressed in terms of Lyotard, doing nothing is also a 'move' in the game. However,

now to the dialectic part: The subtle point is that by every move, which transcends the rules, the rules are continually changed. Though, the bright reader might ask 'How is it possible to abandon Rousseau's social contract but still attain some contract between people?'. I argue that there is no such controversy, because *being and acknowledgment* is not just dialectic apart, but also constitutes a dialectic relationship together, as Jean-Paul Sartre writes (Sartre 1972: 55). The contract of the rules of the game are, therefore, only understood as the acknowledgment of the reality, as being, of the game *as it is*. To make a *new rule* is to transcend and break the rules by a will that does either something or nothing, which is, again, contracted by acknowledgment of the rule regardless of approval hereto.

The point is that whenever this private act of freedom is done then it can be considered as official and possible to understand, discuss and outline moral guidelines for. The problem is just that we fall into the typical utilitarian hypothetical questions whether a specific life is worth more saving than another.

## 2) On the metaphysics of utilitarian rules and acts

Act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism therefore deserves some attention, since we discuss rules contrary to acts. J. J. C. Smart defines the two concepts as follows:

Act-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness and wrongness of an action is to be judged by the *consequences, good or bad, of the action itself*. Rule-utilitarianism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the goodness and badness of the *consequences of a rule that everyone should perform the action in like circumstances* (Smart 1998: 9, my italics)

We thereby understand the major difference of acts and rules consisting of an injunction and deontology due to some kind of rule-following defined by the rule-utilitarianism. The underlying logical aspect in the discussion

of morality is therefore quite defining to the moral conclusion, because it is a question of modalities as *may*, *should* and *could*. On the contrary, Smart explains that David Lyons argues that rule-utilitarianism collapses into act-utilitarianism, if the utilitarian rule allows an exception for itself (Smart 1998: 11). We can point out the similarity in which rule-utilitarianism reminds of a Kantian imperative, and the act-utilitarianism reminds us of a personal relationship to a relevant case. But the major point drawn from the existential perspective is that this personal relationship is not considered official in the sense that the reasons are explicable hereof. The act of freedom is in its own sense a private relationship in which one self must acknowledge themselves guilty hereof. The point is not whether the differences between act- and rule-utilitarianism will provide any answers for us. Anyhow, a following brief outline helps us to point out *why* a temporal view is necessary for the treatise of overpopulation and *why* the metaphysics of utilitarianism or any other moral formal activity does not provide any answers.

The metaphysical problem lies in the anticipation that it is possible to *know* the consequences. We therefore rather say too little, rather than to babble contradictions and tautologies. In other words, we do attain a nietzschean epistemology that challenges a utilitarian thought: In *Götzen-Dämmerung* Nietzsche treats a confusion between cause and effect. The problem is for Nietzsche that this confusion is a corruption of the reason. Not because reason in itself is worth saving since this reason happens to constitute a logical system, which thereby happens to have an implication on social metaphysics (Nietzsche 1999: 74-9). No - Nietzsche treats the corruption of the reason because the reason as a logical system happens to have an implication on social metaphysics *as morality*, which further works like guidelines and prescriptions by which the world is re-interpreted and as if the future is known as consequences due to causality (Nietzsche 1999: 88; Nietzsche 1974: 300-1). However, is it not

paradoxically to criticize the utilitarian thought of causality, as consequence, as a calculation for moral good and bad while arguing reasonable in a way that contributes an idea of causality and its eligibility? No, causality is not here concerned with arguments and its propositions logical inferences, but it concerns the temporal uncertainty of the future, by which Wittgenstein outline the central point in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*:

6.36311 - Dass die Sonne morgen aufgehen wird, ist eine Hypothese; und das heisst: wir *wissen* nicht, ob sie aufgehen wird.  
6.37 - Einen Zwang, nach dem Eines geschehen müsste, weil etwas anderes geschehen ist, gibt es nicht. Es gibt nur eine *logische* Notwendigkeit (Wittgenstein, 2010: 180)

Considerations on the future is only hypotheses, which demands a logical necessity but does not provide any necessity for events to happen in the real world. Nietzsche express same point but linked to morality:

*Den Conservativen in's Ohr gesagt.* — Was man früher nicht wusste, was man heute weiss, wissen könnte —, eine *Rückbildung*, eine Umkehr in irgend welchem Sinn und Grade ist gar nicht möglich. Wir Physiologen wenigstens wissen das. Aber alle Priester und Moralisten haben daran geglaubt, — sie *wollten* die Menschheit auf ein *früheres* Maass von Tugend zurückbringen, *zurückschrauben* (Nietzsche 1999: 144)

The morality Nietzsche criticize is a regressive conservative morality, which in our case is the reversed point, but shares the same epistemological point. The fact that utilitarianism find it possible to know something about the future through a logical reasoning, is what makes it a progressive conservative morality – ‘Of course we do not know the actual outcome; we just know hypotheses’. The problem is therefore that the utilitarian way of calculating morality is to anticipate that the future as consequence is fully intelligible, which thereby recalls former virtues and



values, as in good and bad. Anyhow, we are in this treatise not concerned the moralists' tendency to repeat a former virtue as a prescription for *how to act*. We are rather concerned with the general moral problem in an anticipation of an idealistic moral attitude in a world in which former reasonable arguments is no longer reasonable due to new premises for the consequences of an action. However, the general moral problem disputes, in any case, the question concerning *how to act*. In this clarification of the general moral problem of *how to act*, we encounter a distinction of the enfolding of the moral problem in the continuation of our article's scenario:

3) *A temporal view as the framework for distinguishing between moral problems*

We can distinguish the moral problem into three stages along the understanding of a timeline ((A) past, (B) present, (C) future). (A) The first is *before* the actual, physical and practical problem caused by overpopulation, but still in the knowledge of the statistical and logical confirmation of the overpopulation necessarily becoming reality. Here in the light of knowledge, in the *illumination* as a revelation and certainty, the moral problem is expressed as a disposition of *how to prevent* the actual outcome. If the prevention fails, and if there is certainty about this as a fact, the moral problem will be expressed as *how to settle*, as a distinction to the past tense's moral disposition. We therefore get two distinctions of moral disposition during the time *before* the actual conflict.

The second distinction (B) of the moral problem at hand is when the overpopulation as a global problem is *present* and real. Its presence is contemporary with our own lives. It is intrusive. The moral problem is here expressed as *how to overcome*. The question about *how to overcome* the threat of life, in its necessity of casualties from overpopulation, will be an alteration of the moral aspect in this temporal distinction shown

through Peter Singer's hypothetical case of *the drowning child* (Singer 2009: 3). The relevance of the third distinction of the moral problem (C) is due to the understanding of oneself as an *overcomer* – as a survivor. Therefore, the distinction of the moral problem here concerns *how to relate*, because the consciousness of the conscience of the reasons oneself had overcome is the only intrusive problem. With these clarifications, we are ready to progress the moral problem in relation to overpopulation. The temporal view is the basis for the analysis of possible moral challenges:

### **III – The case of the drowning child**

Before any further treatment, we need definition of the prerequisite premises as existential parameters for the treatment of moral problems in the perspective of overpopulation:

- 1) Every human being is seeking self-preservation (Nietzsche 1974), as a *Wille zum Leben* (Will to life) as Schopenhauer calls it (Schopenhauer 2014: § 27).
- 2) Human reasoning is instrumental for attaining self-preservation and preservation as a *end* (Horkheimer 1947: 3-4).
- 3) Humans somehow quantify practical life into principles about general preservation as a universal end through obligation (Singer, 1997) and imperatives (Kant 1947).

The latter is an acknowledgment of that reason is unavoidable no matter how corrupted it might be and therefore desired to avoid. This is the same reason why Nietzsche anticipates an immoralist (Nietzsche 1999: 86-87). These premises will be the backstopping human properties and moral tendencies. They are the basis for our analysis of Peter Singer's case of 'the drowning child': In Singer's case, a person finds a drowning child in a shallow pond. Finding the drowning child confronts the person with a

moral problem in the dilemma about whether he should jump in the water and get wet clothes by saving the child. The person is considering whether the loss of 'dry clothes' will outweigh the death of the child or not. Just to clarify, Singer's case is made for pointing out the *obligation* for helping and preserving the child's life grounded in the obvious and grotesque outweighing of a child's life by the sustaining of clean and dry clothes (Singer 2009: 3). We will, however, discard the thought of obligation to *attain a case* where the temporal distinction can be used without any immediate issues, and yet still operate under the prerequisite premises. The reason why the thought of obligation is discarded is threefold. *First*, the agreement of the moral obligation is something that is not similar to actual performing the obligation in practical life<sup>3</sup>. *Second*, the case of overpopulation implicates a necessary loss of human lives, which therefore alters the case of the drowning child. That someone *has to die* adds this necessary premise to the calculation of *the morally right*. To save the child and support preservation would be self-extinction in case of the scenario of overpopulation. *Third*, *self-preservation* is superior to *human preservation* due to a logical implication by the two premises of preservation: Self-preservation cannot take place if it is necessary for some humans to be excluded for preservation and oneself is part of the exclusion. On the other hand, self-preservation can take place if it is included in the preservation of the necessary circumstances of exclusion of some other humans' preservation. Thus, self-preservation is a superior premise by logical implication and a crucial change of the approach to moral. Likewise, it is an account for changing general moral metaphysics. In other words, it is difficult to imagine a world where altruistic suicide<sup>4</sup> is

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<sup>3</sup> Wang Yue (an example hereof) is a Chinese two-year-old hit and run victim of 13 October 2011, which received no help from people walking, cycling and driving by after the accident (Moore 2011)

<sup>4</sup> This is in a slight other meaning than Durkheim's conception hereof in his treatise *On Suicide*, since I am not thinking of a suicide *because* of something but suicide *for*

common. I will now clarify the case of the drowning child in perspective of the fourfold temporal distinction of the moral problem.

#### **IV – The case of the drowning child under the fourfold temporal distinction of the moral problem’s structure**

##### *1) How to prevent*

When focusing on the case of the drowning child we are fixating the case, as it was *present* and *actual*. However, since the case is not the case of overpopulation we are imagining that this *could be* the case. It is *possible* that overpopulation *will be* an actual global problem. We will therefore think of our temporal distinction of our moral problem as before the actuality; we will focus on *how to prevent it*. Moreover, the answer appears obvious and hypothetical to us. We can build a fence around the pond or remove the pond, or develop technology to maintain increasing demand on food supplies. Nevertheless, the hypothetical and obvious solution will in the crisis’ actuality necessarily be a failure: If the crisis *is* present, then the prevention would not have worked. Therefore, whatever happens now, which will not prevent the feared outcome, will provide us, in the light of its actuality, a *different* description of its reasons *to become actual and present*. This might be a self-evident argumentation and point, but I want to emphasize the underlying metaphysical problem concerning the moral problem, which consist of the Aristotelian (a) transition from potentiality to actuality and (b) future contingent propositions. The metaphysical problem I point out is thus merely the same critique Kierkegaard directs toward the antique anticipation of time and knowledge (Kierkegaard 1963b: 115), which is that everything known is learned from the eternity of the soul, as Plato argues in *Meno* (Plato 2011: 80d-86d). Aristotle

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something for someone else (as an example we can think ‘*Kællingekløfter*’s function in Greenland before colonization).

expressed this in terms by the paradox of the future sea-battle in *De Interpretatione*:

For if every affirmation or negation is true or false it is necessary for everything to be the case or not to be the case [...] I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary for a sea-battle to take place tomorrow, nor for one not to take place - though it is necessary for one to take place or not to take place (Aristotle 1995: 18a-19b)

The problem is, moreover, that contingency of the proposition is universally true but the particular event is not. That is also the reason why Aristotle's *first philosophy* is concerned outlining the *principles of being qua being* (Aristoteles 1995: 1003b). These principles (gr. αρχή) are found via wisdom from the principles of being: that is through an investigation of the causes (gr. αἰτία), which the wisdom finds as universal by treating a *primary 'why'* (Ibid.: 983a). However, the metaphysical problem consists in the answering of this *why*. The problem is, as noticed above, that the reason cannot foresee, as rules, the future as the free will make it as an act.

## 2) *How to settle*

Thus, moral hypothetical considerations seem purposeless and we will rather focus on the acknowledgement of the *coming of the moral problem* and consider the moral problem as *how to settle*. At *some point* a child will fall in the pond *somewhere* and drown, just as if the overpopulation at *some point* will be present and actual *somewhere*. The reader should make a short notice of the difference between the cases. The cases differ in criteria and phenomenal behavior, when one case is exemplifying a single threatened life of an individual and the other of whole populations. We are in acknowledgement of *how to settle*, which led to form a strategy to overcome the foresighted crisis. In analogy to the case of the drowning child, we are inclined to say that we could install 'life preservers' at every

accessible pond, make swimming lessons obligatory for every baby, child and adult *or* say that every drowning child is exposed to the relentless ways of nature and things will be as things are. Likewise, we could, in our settling for the coming crisis of overpopulation, define a group of people who are unworthy to live and exclude them from preservation, make ration coupons, try to adjust Adam Smith's capitalistic thoughts so the criteria of success is human preservation rather than economic growth (Smith 1993: 10-13) or simply do nothing. There are two points of interest in these analogies: First, we must ask how we can consider nature's intervention as an unacceptable condition of life. In the case of the drowning child this question sounds more like ignorance, but it distinguishes a line where we on one hand must consider *acceptance* towards nature's foundation of the premises of life and on the other hand *ignorance* towards nature's foundation of the premises of life (and thereby ignoring factors for preservation). The question is nonetheless; will we rather consider this distinction of the approach to life as a moral foundation? My answer is 'no' because morality cannot be grounded upon ignorance nor acceptance alone and has nothing to do with it. If someone is inclined to say 'yes', then the person also supports the idea of morality as a matter of *defining* nature and the practical life's approach to it as a way to fixate the will in a set of legal and illegal actions. Moreover, this explication of morality has nothing to do with practical life, besides making human actions predictable, causal and deterministic. The second point of interest from the analogy is the 'doing nothing to settle'-solution from the exemplifying of how to settle for our scenario's crisis. Will you call this amoral? If you answer 'yes' then are you struck with the problem of knowing – as unfolded in *how to prevent*: You cannot know whether 'doing nothing to settle' for the moment will be the wrong or right thing to do. Will you then still call this moral? If you are still inclined to say 'yes' then you cannot *know how moral is* but you can only *guess* and *believe **that*** such and such is the case.

### 3) *How to overcome*

So when we are settling for the crisis of overpopulation, we are groping in the dark. We can only *hope* that we may overcome the crisis. However, in the presence and actuality of the crisis, our view on morality has changed from a contemplative approach to a practical and acting one. When we fixate the criteria for overcoming the crisis as *maintaining preservation*, then we also have fixated the moral question in an instrumental utilitarian matter: Those means, which are required to achieve the end, are the only means that can be defined as moral due to their use. If we now should set principles of *how we **ought to*** overcome the crisis as in a criterion of what is *right and wrong, good and bad* and *good and evil*, then the view changes anew. If we ask ourselves '*how to overcome the right way*' then we are fixated in a question of definition, which also addresses the general moral problem, because moral principles are indefinable. In the perspective of the article's assertion of overpopulation as an approaching problem, we have no circumstantial evidence that it will prove any inclinations of what should be the case of a morally right and good way to overcome this. I may have stated this in a cowardly manner, but I abandon the assertion of an existence of morality as a skeptic. Nonetheless, the only acceptable remarks to morality in this view will be that the question concerning moral essence contains a huge problem of definition. However, the definition of involvement as the *principle of an act's singularity* is implicating an interesting basis. Doing nothing is always doing something as a move in the game. So in the perspective of a doubted existence of moral essence as a calculator for *what to do*, we are still *doing*, but without moral reasoning. So, *is abandoning morality morally acceptable?* We will have a difficult time answering this question: If we answer '*yes*' then we constitute morality in its absence which will be contradictory. If we answer '*no*' then we accept the blind groping and accept morality as a *tautological*

*state of concept*: Thus, we have to either accept an approach in the practical life without morality or we have to accept morality as a tautological state of concept. If we accept an approach without typical explanations of moral essence, then the considerations concerning *how to overcome* the crisis, provided by the premise of self-preservation, are the main moral premise. Along this thought, it is more likely that the handling of the conflict will be an extinction of certain groups of people under systematical conditions. If we accept an approach with a tautological state of moral concept then we are inclined to discuss the moral solution, but since no moral solution is required for preservation, it is likely that the conflict will not be solved in any account that moral philosophers would address moral behavior under.

#### 4) *How to relate*

So – if you, anyhow, find yourself overcoming this crisis and conflict you would probably contemplate on the time during the crisis; if not – these memories are repressed. The interesting question is how morality will be approached afterwards. Morality has probably been abandoned due to its impracticability, if even the tautological moral approach has been tried. Adorno's description of what the lesson of Auschwitz should be, as an imperative of what education should *not* be like (Adorno 1971) is not the same basis that the casualties of the crisis of overpopulation will require. These crises of human behavior are of two different sorts, and are incommensurable because there was no outside criteria, which required a lower global population, since Auschwitz simply was made out of *pure will*<sup>5</sup>. This is also the reason why it is so impossible to understand. Nevertheless, any consideration regarding how the individual relates to

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<sup>5</sup> *Pure will* as in the ideological background for asserting Jews and non-Aryan people as *Untermensch*. I am of course aware of social factors also must have played a preliminary role for the reality of the holocaust, but there were no necessity challenging the will to choose its own fate.



what have happened will be of a mere hypothetical art, and I will, therefore avoid any further treatment of the aftermath of the crisis. I will, however, briefly end this article by describing the metaphysical implications dictated by what premises we have distinguished.

### **V – How to settle in a world without morality**

Since moral truth has been exposed to a logical critique we have distinguished two possible moral positions: The first position abandons moral thought due to its contradictory nature grounded in its hypothetical character developed from the case of overpopulation. The other position believes in the existence of a moral reality, but where the concept of morality is in a tautological state and ,thus, indefinable if the criteria for moral argumentation is logical consistency due to what might be considered reasonable. Saving the drowning child or not will in both cases be either morally good or bad, and herein are both cases true: If you save the child then you have acted morally right to the obligation. However, this is a contradiction due to lack of self-preservation. Therefore, by not saving the child, we consider a morally wrong act, in the perspective of obligation, but we have sustained self-preservation, which we consider as founding for a moral approach, anyhow. However, since we must engage in practical life, in a world in conflict with a consciousness of the only possible reality of one of those two moral positions, the actual morality will reveal itself. Either you must settle for a world where morality is abandoned or believed in, but helpless in practical life due to its impractical indefinability. The kind of settlement for a life in a world, where progressive attitudes towards self-preservation are demanded, in which also implicates that a moral reality requires civilized behaviors to enforce themselves, seems like a failure for self-preservation. Settling in a world with no moral reality seems more encouraging, since the world implies a proactive responsibility for self-preservation when practical life expects no formal rules or laws.

This approach seems better than being deceived by moral principles, descriptions and definitions, which are not being respected nowadays anyway and more importantly, that an attitude to life as a trust in a moral reality as a tautological state of concept seems extraordinary helpless to one's own situation in an overpopulated world.

There are simply things in life which is incomprehensible and undebatable. In this matter of fact, I doubt that Habermas' discourse ethics would and could dismantle the conflict (Habermas 2009). I rather trembling think of the unverified words ascribed to the American general Douglas MacArthur's when thinking of a proper discourse for the world in conflict: 'Whoever said the pen is mightier than the sword obviously never encountered automatic weapons'.

Life is simple; it never surpasses itself.

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