Kant and Swedenborg
– or the dreams of a Spirit-Seer and metaphysics inspected by a critical Gerichtshof

Abstract
It is commonly known that Hume played a major role in forming Kant's mature philosophy. But it is lesser known that Kant himself prior to his encounter with Hume, had a pivotal encounter with the Swedish mathematician and mysticist Emanuel Swedenborg. Thus this article will explore the nature of Kant's encounter with Swedenborg in order to show that Kant's Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik from 1766 has had an impact on Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

Vermittelst der Vernunft ist der Seele des Menschen ein Geist (mens, vox) beigegeworden, damit er nicht ein bloß dem Mechanismus der Natur und ihren technisch-praktischen, sondern auch ein der Spontanität der Freiheit und ihren moralisch-praktischen Gesetzen angemessenes Leben führe.


Introduction
In the beginning of 1755, Immanuel Kant was fully engaged in finishing his essay Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio (Succinct Exposition of Some Meditations on Fire), a text which later that spring earned him the title of Magister. Others¹, however, were around the same

¹ Cf. Johann Georg Sulzer and Johann Nicolas Tetens. For a more detailed discussion of David Hume's philosophical impact on the German Enlightenment see. Watkings 2005:
time in the German philosophical milieu fully engaged and occupied with something completely different; namely one of the first translations in German of a certain Scottish philosopher. The young thirty-one year old magister was at that time unaware of the philosophical problems that this Scotsman, David Hume should give rise to, and the major impact Hume eventually would have on his own philosophy. However, it is well known that Hume was the one that awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber (dogmatischen Schlummer – Kant 2014b: 118[A13]). And it is also commonly known that Kant in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788) stated that the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) (hereafter; KrV) is „occasioned” by the sceptical teaching of Hume (Kant 2014a: 168[I.I.II [A92]). Or at least this is what Kant himself tells his audience. Hence if one takes these statements seriously and thereby renders Hume and his sceptical teaching to be a large part of Kant's discussion of dogmatic metaphysics in KrV, one could easily miss one of Kant's so-called pre-critical discussions, regarding dogmatic metaphysics or as Kant termed this in the year of 1766; Träume der Metaphysik.

The overall aim of this article is then, to show that Hume is not to be seen as the only one who has had a crucial impact on Kant's mature philosophy (in casu 'critical philosophy'). In order to show this, the first part of this article is devoted to a discussion of Kant's own inquiry of dogmatic metaphysics in Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766) (hereafter; TG)². This discussion of TG will lead to the preface A of KrV. Our aim is then to show how preface A of KrV bears witness to the discussion of dogmatic metaphysics in TG which will form the

364-373, Kuehn 1987: 36-51. In the running text, titles of Kant's works will loosely follow the acronyms of Eisler. Other title abbreviations can be found in the bibliography. See. Eisler, 1969: vii-viii.
² All references to KrV follows the Felix Meiner edition from 1998, combined with the standard pagination A / B in square brackets. Except from Kant's letters that follows the Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften edition, TG and other works by Kant follow the Shurkamp edition also combined with standard pagination in square brackets.
second part of this article. The third and last part will sum up the previous two parts in order to pinpoint how Kant's encounter with Swedenborg has had an impact on partly the famous *Gerichtshof* and its (critical) functions, partly in Kant's notion of metaphysics in general.

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In order to navigate properly in relation to the scope of this article and its overall aim, it is necessary to make some remarks concerning the methodology of this article. To have a clear notion of one's philosophical methodology is commonly regarded as the feeling of *terra firma* under one's feet. Thus one can choose the character of this *terra firma* to be hermeneutic, phenomenological, post-structural etc. If one, however, is lost in the woods of the broad variety of methodically approaches – do *not* despair; the solution is simple to follow – as Descartes recommend – a straight line or to walk straight ahead (*marcher toujours le plus droit*), then you will eventually find your way out (Descartes 2011: 43-44[III.2., 24.18-25.20]). Even though one finds one’s way out of the woods, the problem of methodology is not automatically solved. Hence this 'straight line' is an axiomatic pathway and thus another methodical standpoint. On the basis of this short discussion of one's methodically approach we will “simply” choose to read Kant through Kant himself\(^3\), in order to follow as closely as possible the inherent *Räsonnement* of Kant’s own text. This also permits us to philosophize by and with Kant himself, so that we are qualified in using some of Kant's own interpretation “tools”. Regarding these “tools” we will now turn to the Kantian *Leitfaden*.

In a minor work of Kant, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* (1784), Kant set forth, among other topics, his

\(^3\) This choice of method is motivated and inspired by Adorno's *immanente Kritik*. See. Adorno 1990: 33-34.
idea of how to comprehend the history of mankind. Kant's idea of history is an attempt to interpret the long chain of historical events, not as meaningless and random occurrences, but as a chain of meaningfulness. This meaningfulness of history is in other words Kant's insistence on that a philosopher is allowed to find a so-called: „Naturabsicht in diesem widersinnigen Gange menschlicher Dinge“ (Kant 1977: 34[A388]). However if a philosopher is allowed by Kant to find an Absicht in history, one also has to presuppose an idea about history from whence one can start one's interpretation of history. This idea or basis is what Kant called a (philosophical) Leitfaden (Ibid.: 49-50[A410]). If Kant on the one hand allows such a (heuristic) tool for interpreting the human history, we therefore are allowed on the other hand - combined with our methodological standpoint (cf. immanente Kritik) – to use a certain kind of Leitfaden in our interpretation of Kant. But where are we to start?

I: The making of Kritik der reinen Vernunft

Our postulate is that one of Kant’s main motivations for writing KrV is well founded in a letter to Fräulein Charlotte von Knobloch in 1763. In this letter Kant himself states that the belief in „die verneinende Seite“ is in an agreement with „der gesunden Vernunft“ (Kant, AA X: 43-44), and that this standpoint was his own: „Stellung, in welcher sich mein Gemüth von langer Zeit her befand [sic!]“ (Ibid.: 44 - my supplement). But all this changed when Kant encounters „Herrn Swedenborg“ (Idem.). As we shall see, this acquaintance with Emanuel Swedenborg changed the character of Kant's way of believing in the “other side” (Jenseits) and in view of this, Swedenborg may be the first to have galvanised Kant in his dogmatic beliefs. Hence Kant's encounter with Swedenborg is our Leitfaden in showing that

4 Cf. what we today call the 'spiritual world'.
this “meeting” has had an impact on Kant's mature philosophy or critical way of doing philosophy (Palmquist 2000: 18).

I, a: Kant's theoretical inquiry of the Geisterseher

As stated in the previous section, one can rightfully approach Kant's philosophy in the same way as Kant approaches history. And in doing so, the following section is devoted to give our account of Kant's discussion of Herrn Swedenborg with intentions of showing that this discussion also has some clear connections to KrV's main objectives.

In TG, Kant deals with Swedenborg's the Geisterseher, in order to cast light on the „ander Welt”, through the dreams of metaphysics (Kant 2012: 923[A4]). But what is meant by 'the dreams of metaphysics'? In order to answer this question we must first take a closer look at what Kant himself finds to be „Nützlich” in this inquiry (Ibid.: 924[A6]). However TG consists of two parts, which deals with the subject in question in different manners. Because an exhaustive analysis of TG will exceed the aim and scope of this article, it will be adequate just to point out the main conclusions of TG's two parts. In the theoretical (dogmatic) first part of TG; Kant distinguishes himself from the academics who frown upon the: „vernünftige: Ich weiß nicht”, and the philosophers that jump to conclusions about: „Ein Geist […] ist ein Wesen, welches Vernunft hat” (Ibid.: 925[A7-8]), because Kant does not even know: „was das Wort Geist bedeute” (Ibid.: 926[A9]). However these remarks, as we shall see, set the tone of the forthcoming inquiry of the world of spirits (Geister). Kant starts out by testing the assumption of an immaterial being with reason (Ibid.: 927-935[A11-28]) with his dependency on the: „allgemeinen menschlichen Verstande” (Ibid.: 943[A41])⁵. As a result of this method, the question of spirits „übersteigen” Kant's own „Einsicht“ (Ibid.: 936[A29]), because no matter what we as human beings

⁵ Which Kant finds in himself and by his own understanding, Ibid.: 960 [A74].
do, spirits are nowhere to be found in the empirical (Ibid.: 950-951[A55-57]). This also reveals what metaphysical dreams are made of.

Metaphysics as a discipline – without the empirical - has thereby a tendency to be very flexible in its use of principles. This means that the principles one makes use of in a metaphysical inquiry in advance fits the result of that very same inquiry(Ibid.: 952-953[58-61]). This makes metaphysical principles to be „lauter Luft“ (Ibid.: 961[A76]), just as the visions of spirits are, when it comes to the measuring of the „Verstandeswaage“ (Ibid.: 960[A74]). Even though Kant regards this scale to be free of all „Parteilichkeit“ (Idem.), it still suffers from a minor “defect” which is called: „Hoffnung der Zukunft“ (Ibid.: 961[A75]). This is of course of major significance to Kant’s much later Metaphysik der Sitten, but in our context the point is however that; these stories of spirits have in this way, a place in the scale-pan of hope in contrast to the theoretical scale-pan (Palmquist 2000: 21). Kant thereby concludes that from now on, one can have all sorts of opinions about such spiritual beings but not: „wissen“ (Kant 2012: 923[A79]). The crucial point to be made here is that this also leads Kant to say that from an anthropological perspective this demonstrates the limits (Grenzen) of man's reasoning, and from a philosophical perspective this points to – albeit via negativa – that one theoretically has to establish: „die Grenzen unserer Einsicht“, by the „Data“ found in the empirical (Ibid.:963[A80]). However, in the best Kantian or traditional Aristotelian way, the theoretical perspectives cannot stand alone. Hence in the following section we have to take a closer look at the practical part of TG, in order to get the full account of Kant’s encounter with Herrn Swedenborg.

I, b: Kant's practical inquiry of the Geisterseher
In the previous section, we saw how Kant in TG's theoretical part established a measuring tool out of the universal human understanding (Verstand).
And as a result we shall in the coming section see what consequences this limiting activity of the theoretical part has within the practical part.

In the second and practical part of TG Kant tells us that Swedenborg’s speculations (cf. Speilwerk - Ibid.: 961[A75]) of contact with spirits, divinations and Traumdeutung (cf. Oneiromancy)\(^6\), compared to the earlier mentioned usage of metaphysical principles are the same as the: „Scheingründe der Vernuft“ (Ibid.: 968[A89]), which is why the Speilwerk of Swedenborg is the same as the „Schlaraffenlande der Metaphysik“ (Idem.), of the philosophers (in casu 'the dreams of metaphysics'). But how is all this possible? Because the inquisitive (wißbegierige) human mind (Ibid.:969 [A91]), leaves the frontiers between „Torheit and Verstand", and the distinction between „Wahrheit und Betrug” so poorly marked (Ibid.: 969-970[A90-91]). This however leads Kant to modify his approach towards this inquisitiveness and by his modest and critical (Ibid.: 969[A90]), attitude he reminds us: „daß all Erkenntnis zwei Ende habe”, i.e. a priori, and a posteriori (Ibid.: 971[A94]). In illustrating the two ways of acquiring knowledge in a philosophical manner, Kant is attributing the 'a posteriori' to the empiricist, and the 'a priori' – as Kant states; the other extreme – to the metaphysical philosopher (Ibid.: 971[A94-95]). On the one hand the empirical way of doing philosophy falls short in its chain of reasoning by a: „Warrum” (Ibid.: 971[A94] / cf. When reasons (Grunde) continue ad infinitum). On the other hand the metaphysical way of doing philosophy suffers from groundless assumption when it starts off by: „ich weiß nicht wo”, which leads the philosophical inquiry to: „ich weiß nicht wohin” (Ibid.: 971[A95] / I.e. as mentioned before, by applying ad hoc (unempirical and) randomly selected principles to fit the outcome). Here it becomes clear that

\(^6\)Cf. the three stories which demonstrate Swedenborg’s “gifts”. Ibid.: 965-968[A82-88]. If one is interested in similar stories by Swedenborg, and the connection between this world and the other world, in an authentic tone then Swedenborg’s Drömboken is worth consulting (cf. His “book” is actually diary notes). In Danish: Swedenborg, Emanuel, Drommebogen, Hans Reitzel 1999.
if philosophy as a discipline methodologically should choose pathways between either the empirical way or the speculative way, this becomes a *false dichotomy*. As we shall see, this dispute between the empiricist and the metaphysical philosopher foreshadows the *Kampfplatz* of metaphysics in Preface A. However because of this dispute it seems that there is not much *hope* for metaphysics which Kant finds himself to be *in love* with (Ibid., 982[A115]). But how can one conceive Kant's early solution to these problems of metaphysics? By regarding metaphysics *qua:* „Wissenschaft von den Grenzen der menschlichen Vernunft“ (Ibid.: 983[A116]). Kant states that this creates: „ein kleines Land“(Idem.) – as implied; of metaphysics (Höffe 2003: 325) – which is lesser known by philosophy. This land is however habitable if one in a philosophical inquiries make use of the *Data* found in this world, and not in some: „andern Welt“ (Kant 2012: 983[A166]). This is also the only way to make room for questions of *metaphysica specialis*, or as it is spelled out in *TG*; the (spiritual – if there is any) nature, freedom, theological predestination (Ibid.: 985[A120]). But the obvious question is now; where are we to start this *science of limitations*? By the: „stiiptische Kraft der Selbsterkenntnis“ (Ibid.: 983[A117]). But what does this mean? As mentioned in the beginning, the useful (Nützlich) by Kant's inquiry in *TG* proves philosophically, that metaphysics as the *science of limitations* brings forth, the task not only of knowing the empirical *Gegenstände*, but more importantly the *relation* between the object and the „Verstande des Menschen“ (Ibid.:985[A120]).

As a reader of *KrV*, many themes and points in the previous exposition of *TG* has striking similarities and even some methodical parallels with Kant's critical philosophy. But in order not to jump to conclusions about Kant's early encounter with Swedenborg, we must carefully examine the Preface A of *KrV* in addition to the practical and theoretical conclusions of *TG* – and as we shall see, this analysis may cast some light on Kant's notion anno 1766 of partly; the *wißbegierige* human mind, partly; metaphysics.
II: The essential features of the human Gemüt

In the previous part we saw how Kant narrowed down the notion of metaphysics to the science of limitations of the human mind. Furthermore Swedenborg’s Speilwerk is just as incoherent as the speculation of a metaphysical philosopher that disregards the touchstone of empirical data in hers/his philosophical inquiries. And as shown this is a result of the inquisitiveness of the human mind, which is why Kant in the opening of KrV states that:

Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal in einer Gattung ihrer Erkenntnisse: daß sie durch Fragen belästigt wird, die sie nicht abweisen kann, denn sie sind ihr durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, die sie aber auch nicht beantworten kann, denn sie übersteigen alles Vermögen der menschlichen Vernunft (Kant 1998: 5[Avii]).

If we recall the conclusions of TG, Kant (again) in the quote above points out the tendency of the human mind to transcend its own capacity. But in contrast to TG, metaphysics in KrV cannot be regarded as Wissenschaft in a strict sense (i.e. natural science and mathematics / Ibid.: 19-20 [Bxiv-xv]) due to the fact that Kant in KrV now is aware of the fact, that not all of the activities of the human mind can be reduced to principles and concepts (Ibid.: 21-22, 440 [Bxvii/B395] / Hass 1978: 135). The crucial point for Kant in KrV is thus not to serve one with ultimate solutions by means of a doctrine (Kant 1998: 31-32[Bxxxi-ii]), i.e. to dismiss these questions above because this, as we have seen, is the way the academic handled such questions in TG. The point is rather to give an answer to how one can conceive (begreifen) the possibility for even asking such questions in a rightful manner without being deluded by the: „Scheingründe der Vernunft“.

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7 To be clear, we will in the following use the word ‘mind’ in the untranslatable notion of the Danish ‘sind’ and the German ‘Gemüt’.
8 Even though Kant wants to avoid all sorts of dogmatism he, himself cannot hide his un-critical bias assumption that only objective cognition can be regarded as science.
Moreover such questions of reason are: „natürliche und unvermeidliche“, which to the: „menschlichen Vernunft unhintertreiblich anhängt“ (Ibid.: 408[B354]). However if one is looking for an answer to the questions that the human reason is burdened with, KrV is certainly not the place to look, since here Kant seeks out the possibilities and the validity of (objective) cognition as such. Hence Kant’s search for the right way to use one’s reason once again sets off by examining one of the oldest themes within philosophy; metaphysics, but as mentioned above not as a science. But how are we to understand Kant’s notion of metaphysics then? To answer this question it is necessary to take a closer look again at the quotation above.

The key to Kant’s opening quotation in Preface A is the ambiguity of the conflictual nature of reason itself. Although TG brought about some illuminating remarks concerning this 'conflictual nature of reason', this ambiguity of the Preface A still begs the question; what did Kant exactly mean by 'die Natur der Vernunft selbst'? As stated in the quotation and in TG, the human reason has a certain tendency to ask questions that transcend (übersteigen) the very capacity of the human reason itself. But this inquisitiveness of reason might also provide us with the necessary clue for the following task. If the human reason has such a tendency to transcend its own capacity, this also implies that Kant (already) has a clear notion of what there is to transcend and inherent to this; a clear notion of its capacity.

Instead of just pointing out what Hegel already had done, by saying that this Kantian notion of the human mind is fixed by various preconceptions or: „als der weise Vorsatz jenes Scholastikus“ (Hegel 1970: 54[§10]), we will put an emphasis on something else. This clear notion of the capacity of the mind can also be seen as establishing the quotation as a diagnosis (Höffe 2003: 32), of the essence (Wesen) of the human mind. The advantage of

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9 To be very clear; this diagnosis of the essence of reason is not to be confused with a sort of Dingerlehre, because Kant de jure cannot say anything about this essence (Wesen) in itself (an sich), but only de facto show how it works or how to grasp its functions (Vermögen) from a subjective point of view. Moreover Kant uses the word 'Natur' in at least
understanding the above mentioned quotation as a diagnosis, has a very important point, namely that the inquisitiveness of reason shows that it is a part of human nature to deal with epistemological matters that are far beyond any human capability as such. But in which way? To solve this, one has to pay close attention to the “given-ness” of these questions and to the fact that these questions are given to (aufgegeben) reason by reason itself. As we have seen in TG this “given-by-reason-to-reason-itself” can have a disastrous outcome when it is not combined with empirical data. Understood in this manner; the mere speculative use of reason is roughly to be seen and understood as unregulated metaphysical claims or propositions (Adorno 2001: 48), or as a groping with: „bloßen Begriffen”(Kant 1998: 20[Bxv]). But this is metaphysics and speculation in a negative sense (i.e. the flaws of metaphysics), whereas Kant’s suggestions for a positive sense (i.e. what metaphysics actually can do) of metaphysics make metaphysics to be about: „Erkenntnis a priori, oder aus reinem Verstande und reiner Vernunft” (my emphasis – Kant 2014b: 124[§1]). And as the title of the work (in casu KrV) suggests; this pure (Kant 1998: 80[A11]) metaphysical activity of reason with reason itself, the Speilwerk of Swedenborg and furthermore the inquisitiveness of reason calls for a critique which also brings about an alternative pathway to the false dichotomy of TG.

II, a: In which way is the queen of all the sciences dissatisfied?
In the previous section we saw how the opening lines of KrV formulated the main reason for regulating the pure use of reason due to the content of the Kantian diagnosis. Thus now we will explore the following remarks on metaphysics that led Kant to determine the powerlessness of Hecuba.

To be clear, Kant on one hand finds these irresolvable questions in the human mind, because of its: „besondere Schicksal”, while on the other four different meanings, whereas Kant in this context uses the word in a dual sense; (1) erkenntniskritischen and (2) metaphysical(Weyand 1964: 59).
hand, Kant also finds that reason itself – just as in *TG* – is not to be blamed for this *misère* (Ibid.: 5[Avii]). The *fate* of reason is therefore the inherent *tendency* of reason's nature to ask such speculative and unregulated questions, which can be compared with what mathematicians call: *invariants* (Adorno 2001: 46). As in applied mathematics in the field of physics, some property of a given object stays the same throughout the mathematical operation. The “*invariants*” of reason is then metaphysical propositions, and in using one's reason (i.e. the *operations* of the reason), such propositions are *inevitable* – but to be deluded by them is *not* unavoidable. The inevitability of such propositions is thus a result of using „bloßen Begriffen” and principles (*Grundsätzen*), that are far beyond the – which also echoes Kant's standpoint in *TG* – : „Grenze aller Erfahrung” (Kant 1998: 5[Avii]). This is also why Kant states that all previous attempts to proclaim metaphysical *knowledge*, have only led to „Dunkelheit und Widersprüche” (Idem.), and an ongoing battle in philosophy. Furthermore this battle of the right way to conceive the nature of the human mind and the pure speculative reason; „heißt nun *Metaphysik*” (Idem.). What is worth noticing here is the adverb 'nun' that points directly to the time in which Kant lived and consequently to what he thinks of the current conditions of metaphysics. These conditions of metaphysics are partly the conclusion of the diagnosis set forth by Kant, partly the *now* available point of departure, whereas the main task regarding metaphysics is to show why: „der Modeton des Zeitalters” (Idem.), has triggered a disdain (*Verachtung*) of metaphysics. What Kant here offers is an indication of, that metaphysics *still* is an issue worth examining, and that the forthcoming *critique* of the pure reason has its *Ursprung* in the above mentioned diagnosis. But why does Kant insist on this critique of pure reason? Because the overall task „der reien Vernunft selbst” is, as Kant states: „Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit”(Ibid.: 51[B7]). Hence the *critique* is the key to *avoid* deluded claims of *wissen* within the fields of *metaphysica specialis* - a point
that in TG has a clear parallel; Kant 2012: 985[A120] – but first Kant has to show why this despair has shown itself. In order to get a hold of this despair of metaphysics one has to pay close attention to the above mentioned remarks concerning metaphysics and the human mind. Due to the importance Kant sees in the field of research of metaphysics (cf. „Erkenntnis a priori”) it is hence as a discipline de jure worth the title 'the queen of all sciences'. However both the inconsiderate principles of metaphysics mentioned in TG, and the natural tendency of the human mind to transcend its capacity results in the Schlaraffenlande der Metaphysik. This furthermore brings forth the despair, because, the discipline of metaphysics, conceived in this way, de facto shows that its deeds, so far have resulted in an ongoing battle. Hence a critique is not a critique unless one criticizes the content of metaphysics and the grounds on which this dubious knowledge stems from. Kant's dissatisfaction with metaphysics is thus not about metaphysics itself, but on the contrary the way (i.e. the function of metaphysics) his predecessors have dealt with metaphysical questions. And apropos Kant’s predecessors we now have to take a closer look at the way Kant deals, not with Swedenborg, but with some other previous attempts to proclaim metaphysical knowledge.

II, b: Kant and his predecessors

In the last section we saw how Kant's notion of the famous Kampfplatz is the battle of metaphysics in general. Hence Kant does not refuse metaphysical propositions; he is just dissatisfied with the outcome of metaphysical speculation. Thus we must in the following section clarify the parties of this ongoing war.

A dissatisfaction with the outcome of the metaphysical speculation of philosophy is also a lack of confidence in the human reason itself. This distrust is Kant's version of 'the fashion of the age'’s despise of metaphysics. But who took, in Kant's view, part in this metaphysical battle? And what
went wrong? A standard version lists the two parties of this war to be *rationalism* and *empiricism*. This simplification is however useful only if we think of the *way* these two parties worked within the field of metaphysics. As Kant saw this, rationalism and empiricism could *both* be dogmatic concerning their use of principles (Kant 1998: 571-572[B498-499] / Höffe 2003: 33), which also explains the two extreme positions listed in *TG*.  
Empiricism turns to dogmatism when: „all materials of reason and knowledge“, solely and exclusive originate: „from experience “ (Locke 1972: 77[Book II., I.2.]). Moreover it turns out to be, as Kant remarks, a: „Physiologie des menschlichen Verstandes“ (Kant 1998: 6[Aix]), hence Locke regards all of our ideas in the mind as derived from experience. The “physiological” task for Locke is thus to show that real knowledge is: „*the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas* “(Locke 1972: 133[Book IV., I.2.]). On the other side the bastion of rationalism stands with the dogmatic belief that: „toutes les pensées et actions de notre ame viennent de son propre fonds, sans lui pouvoir être données par les sens“ (Leibniz 2006: 74[I.1.§1;16-17])10, which, as we have seen in *TG*, leads a philosophical inquiry to: „ich weiß nicht *wohin*” (Kant 2012: 971[A95]). Throughout the above mentioned remarks from Locke and Leibniz we catch a glimpse of the battle, and through this self-assuredness of the principles the skeptic arrives into the landscape. In short, the skeptic dismisses all such epistemological claims by showing: „the narrow capacity of human understanding” (Hume 1999: 208[XII, 3.25.]). But what has this war to do with Kant's notion of metaphysics and with Swedenborg? 

As mentioned previously Kant’s standpoint on metaphysics is inextricably linked with pure reason and its task of *metaphysica specialis*

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10 “All of our thoughts and actions originate from our soul itself, and is not be given to it by the senses” - my translation. Notice that this is the core of Leibniz’s idea about the pre-established harmony.
and thus it is „umsonst“ to display: „Gleichgültigkeit“ in Ansehung solcher Nachforschungen”, because: „der menschlichen Natur nicht gleichgültig sein kann“ (my emphasis - Kant 1998: 7[Ax]). As showed in TG, Swedenborg is a case study in how the human reason can get out of control in proclaiming knowledge by unregulated metaphysical propositions. In KrV however Kant restricts such: „metaphysische Behauptungen“ (Idem.) to be signs of the particular carelessness within the philosophy itself, which Kant relates to the: „Urteilskraft des Zeitalters” (Ibid.: 7[Aix]). If this carelessness is to be defeated, this also entails that one cannot any longer palm reason off with: „Sheinwissen“ (Ibid.: 7[Axi]), and for that matter: „Scheingründe der Vernunft“ (Ibid., 2012: 968[A89]. In TG, Kant had some solutions to the adversity of metaphysics, but due to his critical philosophy Kant had – in a more powerful way – to replace something for this Gleichgültigkeit, so that human reason stays on secured ground. Hence we now have to examine the Kantian Gerichtshof.

II, c: A judge to put out all disagreements

As we saw in the previous section Kant’s predecessors had tried to solve the very founding of the principles of human understanding. But both sides’ enquiries resulted in dogmatism, which is why Kant now had to settle peace between the parties involved via the Kantian Gerichtshof.

One has to bear in mind that Kant’s description of the war between empiricism and rationalism frequently makes use of nouns such as „Anarchie“, „Normaden“, „Pöbel“, „Barbarei“, and of course „Recht“ (Ibid., 1998: 6[Aix] / Höffe 2003: 324-325). Because of the skeptic’s „verabscheuen“ of cultivated land (Kant 1998: 6[Aix]), those nouns are pointing toward a geographical set of metaphors (Sinnbilder), which all in all have a clear connection to the Kantian Court of Justice. All the disagreements have to be put out by law and order, which might bring peace to the small country of TG, via the critical Court of Justice of: „das land des
Warheit” (Ibid.: 336[A235]). If we apply this geographical model onto the court itself, then – as mentioned in the first part of the paper – Kant’s notion of the human mind becomes clear. The domain of the Court of Justice establishes a territory or a secured ground where reason cannot overstep the authority of this tribunal. Since the court is established by reason itself, we will postulate that this also establishes the boundaries (Gränzen - Ibid.: 8[Axii]) of the land of the human mind. Because of these boundaries, reason is also bound to those constraints (Schranken)11 set forth by this court which also points to the limitations (Einschränkung – Ibid.: 26[Bxxiv]) of reason due to the task within the critique to find: „der Möglichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit einer Metaphysik überhaupt” (Ibid.: 8[Axii])12. In contrast to the Verstandeswaage in TG, the human reason (Vernunft) in KrV is now the sovereign in a legal sense, in its own land, which partly can be seen as a Westphalian peace to the above mentioned conflict, partly makes Kant’s own time the: „Zeitalter der Kritik”(Ibid.: 7 [Axi]). Although this also points to the so-called “Copernican revolution” in an epistemological sense, it is worth remembering the starting point of the Preface A. The Court of Justice signifies that the critique in our context also can be seen as restrictions (Heidegger 1991: 14-15§3), laid down by metaphysics (Zöller 2011: 26-27), i.e. restrictions to the kind of questions the human mind is burdened with. But where does this leave us in addition to understanding the Kantian version of metaphysics in connection to our inquiry?

As our inquiry has shown: the critical endeavour in KrV to secure the territory of „das land des Warheit”, supersedes the small country of

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11 Which is called „die Marksteine” of the Verstand in TG, [A121], p.985
12 This also points towards Kant’s use of the term ‘deduction’. See. Henrich 1998: 31ff. However Henrich does not have an eye for the distinctive Kantian use of the words: ‘Grenze’ and ‘Schranke’ which are a kind of “operative concepts” in establishing the Kantian Court of Justice. Hence, if one misses this point, one overlooks a significant source in regard hereof. In the Vernunftlehre by Hermann Samuel Reimarus, (that was own by Kant; Werda 1922: 53[X.94,]), Reimarus uses the same words (cf. ’Grenze’ and ’Schranke’) in order to establish his: „Richtstuhl der Vernunft”(Reimaus 1756: 43§38 - „Schranken der Vernunft”). See. Hinske 1980: 9-32.
metaphysics and the science of limitations of the human mind found in TG. Via a critique of pure reason (i.e. Philosophy qua Propädeutik – Kant 1998: 867[A841/B869]) Kant can regulate the pure (and speculative) inquisitiveness of the human mind, which is why a total examination of pure reason in a systematized form leads to the „Inventarium” (Ibid.: 13[Axx]), of the pure (speculative/theoretical) reason itself. In other words, this systematization and in course hereof the laid down restrictions is metaphysics (Ibid.: 867[A841/B869]) qua meta-cognition (i.e. the new function of metaphysics) concerning the possibilities and the validity of objective cognition as such (Zöller 2011: 24). The point is however that on the one hand this Inventarium is what Kant did not establish in TG, but on the other, this has to be established before one – Swedenborg and others like him – can even begin to deal with the real task of 'pure reason' i.e. metaphysica specialis, or: „Die Ideen der reinen Vernunft” (Kant 1998: 729[A669/B667]), in a genuine philosophical manner.

III: A metaphysical concern as a starting point
Sometimes a detour is the shortest way, which certainly is the case of Kant's KrV, and from time to time even the most forgotten, overlooked and neglected can be of crucial significance, which TG exemplifies. But strictly speaking; what was „Nützlich” in this inquiry or detour represented by Swedenborg and TG? Something as old-fashioned as taking a Geisterseher seriously in one's philosophical inquiries. This we can learn from Kant. By taking Swedenborg seriously – even while risking derision (Gespött) – Kant was lead to the task of „abzuziehen”, the „dogmatische Kleid” of Metaphysics in his time, due to his suspicion about the real „Einsichten” of the: „die erträumte Wissenschaft” (Kant AA X: 70 - i.e. unregulated metaphysics), as stated in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn 8th of April 1766 regarding Mendelssohn's assessment of TG. Hence throughout this article it has been shown that the point of departure for Kant to carry out a critique
of the pure reason, is mainly motivated by the questions set forth by a restless speculative use of reason due to the fate of the inquisitive and wissbegierige human mind which Swedenborg was a textbook example of. In the field of philosophy, this motivation for a critique is seen in the dogmatic hopes and dreams of claiming knowledge in the fields of metaphysica specialis. However as showed Kant does not reject metaphysics (in a more elaborated form) as a discipline, but as a science (cf. KrV) – so in order to regain the dignity of this prima philosophia the prime goal is to remove, in a critical manner, all the Scheinwissen of the human mind, in order to secure „das land des Warheit” by the Gerichtshof of law and order. As stated in earlier; Hume is normally seen as having the key role in his mature philosophy, but as our inquiry of Kant's TG has shown, Kant's encounter with Herrn Swedenborg may have made Kant think twice about the nature of the human mind and metaphysics. Thereby Kant makes room, in an anthropological and philosophical rightful manner, for both the topics of and to the completion of the real task of der reinen Vernunft which is - now without its dogmatic clothing: „Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit”.


**Litteraturliste**


